Although an uncommon step, defendants in putative class actions in some jurisdictions may move to deny class certification before discovery begins if the complaint’s proposed class is facially deficient.  A successful motion forces plaintiffs to proceed individually, reducing a defendant’s exposure and eliminating costly discovery into issues of class certification.  But district courts have yet to apply a consistent legal framework to those motions.

In Oliver v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, — F.4th —-, 2026 WL 346144 (4th Cir. Feb. 9, 2026), the Fourth Circuit provided such a framework, holding that “‘the appropriate procedure for a defendant to challenge class certification’—at the pleading stage or any other time—is to make ‘a motion to deny class certification under 23(c)(1)(A), coupled with a motion to strike under 23(d)(1)(D) should the motion to deny class certification be granted.’”. 

Nine mortgage applicants from different states, of different racial backgrounds, seeking different mortgage products, and of varying creditworthiness, alleged Navy Federal Credit Union systematically discriminated against racial minorities in providing residential mortgage products.  The complaint contained two proposed classes, one seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), and another seeking damages under Rule 23(b)(3).  Navy Federal successfully moved to strike the class allegations under Rules 12(f) and 23(d)(1)(D) in the district court.

The Fourth Circuit held that Rule 23(c)(1)(A)—which requires a district court to decide whether to certify a class at an early practicable time—provides the court discretion to make that decision at the pleading stage.  The court reasoned that Rule 12(f)—which defendants often invoke in motions to strike class allegations—lacks any connection to class certification.  And while a court may require a party to amend pleadings to remove allegations about representation of absent persons under Rule 23(d)(1)(D), the Fourth Circuit understood that rule to be “an optional housekeeping provision” that could come into play only after a district court denied class certification. 

The court also explained that a district court, when resolving a motion to deny class certification pre-discovery, may consider only whether the factual allegations in the complaint make a prima facie showing that satisfies Rule 23(a) and (b)’s requirements.  And while an appellate court typically reviews decisions of class certification for abuse of discretion, the court held that premature decisions regarding class certification at the pleading stage constitute legal error, which receives no deference on review.  Applying that de novo standard, the Fourth Circuit determined the district court correctly denied certification of the 23(b)(3) class for failure to sufficiently allege predominance and superiority.  But because the complaint sufficiently alleged the elements for a Rule 23(b)(2) class, it vacated that decision.

Oliver provides class action defendants in the Fourth Circuit a roadmap for challenging class certification pre-discovery: where the face of the complaint makes clear certification cannot be granted, move to deny class certification under Rule 23(c)(1)(A) alongside a motion to strike under Rule 23(d)(1)(D).  Finally, defendants litigating in the Fourth Circuit should be mindful that the timing of motions to deny class certification will impact the level of deference a favorable decision receives on appeal.