In TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court held that “every class member must have Article III standing in order to recover individual damages.”  594 U.S. 413, 427, 431 (2021) (cleaned up).  Post-TransUnion, courts have grappled with that guidance, especially as to whether a class that contains uninjured class members may permissibly be certified.  As set forth in our recent post, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Davis to address a circuit split on that issue.

Concurrent with the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, the Fourth Circuit joined the ongoing debate by holding that under TransUnion, not only must every class member have Article III standing in order for a damages class to be certified, but there also must be a factual basis, supported by evidence, to find that each class member has been injured for certification; a risk of injury is not enough.  Alig v. Rocket Mortgage LLC, 126 F.4th 965 (4th Cir. 2025).

In Alig, aclass of mortgagors alleged that Rocket Mortgage provided them with “worthless” appraisals of their homes because Rocket provided the homeowners’ own estimates of the value of their home to the appraisers, rending the appraisals biased and not independent under West Virginia law.  See id. at 967.  Following a long procedural history—including a trip to the Supreme Court—the district court held that TransUnion did “not impede the class’s showing on standing” because each class member paid for an “independent” appraisal that they never received.  Id. at 968.  Critically, the district court assumed that every appraisal that contained the homeowner’s own estimate of value was automatically “tainted” and therefore not independent, or at the very least, faced a high risk of lacking independence.  Id. at 974–75.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that TransUnion requires more than assumptions, but instead “requires [] a factual showing for each class member to claim damages” and be included in a certified damages class.  Id. at 975.  Because the plaintiffs’ theory of injury rested on speculation rather than evidence, there was no “factual showing” that each class member had been injured and the class could not be certified.  See id.[1]

By requiring an evidentiary basis of injury for all class members, not just speculation or the risk of harm, Alig provides another helpful tool for defendants seeking to defeat certification.

[1] Judge Floyd dissented because, in his view, plaintiffs had demonstrated that each class member suffered a cognizable Article III harm.  See Alig, 126 F.4th at 976 (Floyd, J., dissenting).