A district court in the Northern District of California recently denied Lyft’s motion to dismiss a putative class action on Rule 12(b)(1) grounds after the plaintiff voluntarily amended her complaint under Rule 15 to cure standing issues raised by Lyft.  Zigler v. Lyft, Inc., 2026 WL 1557553 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2026). 

Plaintiff Tracy Zigler’s initial complaint alleged that she paid a premium for a “Priority Pickup” ride but did not receive the benefit of her bargain because the ride did not arrive on time, nor was it faster than the lower-priced “Standard” option.  Lyft moved to dismiss, raising a factual challenge to Zigler’s standing with evidence that she had never purchased a “Priority Pickup” ride. In response, Zigler voluntarily amended her complaint under Rule 15 to (1) allege that she actually paid a premium for “Standard” rides as compared to the even lower-priced “Wait & Save” option, and (2) add two new named plaintiffs who allegedly paid the higher premiums for “Priority Pickup” rides.

Lyft again moved to dismiss, citing Lierboe v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 350 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003), and arguing that, because Zigler lacked standing when she initially filed suit, she had no authority to amend the complaint to cure that jurisdictional defect. The district court rejected Lyft’s argument for three reasons.

First, the court reasoned that Zigler had standing from the start and did not change “the gist of her original complaint” by simply swapping out the service tiers at issue. Second, while acknowledging that Lierboe indicates that, “at some point in the litigation (well outside the Rule 15 timeline), the jurisdictional defect of an unamended complaint cannot be cured nunc pro tunc by a belated attempt to amend the complaint,” the court rejected Lyft’s interpretation “that an early and timely amendment can – categorically – never be given effect where the original complaint suffers from a jurisdictional defect.” That reading of Lierboe, the court concluded, would contravene the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent guidance in James v. Safeguard Properties LLC, 821 F. App’x 683 (9th Cir. 2020), as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in Royal Canin USA v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22 (2025), which made clear that “amendments can not only destroy jurisdiction but also create it.” Finally, the court reasoned that “Lyft’s position [was] in tension with the letter and spirit of” the federal rules insofar as it “ignore[d] the common experience of courts,” which commonly permit timely amendment even where the original complaint implicates a lack of jurisdiction, and “would render Rule 15 a nullity.”

The court went on to reject Lyft’s factual standing challenges to the newly added named plaintiffs, but ordered the parties to meet and confer to determine if they or the court would benefit from a further amended pleading that “provides clarity” on those plaintiffs’ allegations.

Zigler provides a helpful illustration of the limitations of standing challenges under Lierboe, including in view of more recent precedent like Royal Canin. It is also a cautionary tale of how factual standing challenges may backfire when raised in the early stages of a putative class action, including because plaintiffs may be able to cure standing defects through voluntary amendment under Rule 15.